Ayatana - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Ayatana - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia: Āyatana (Pāli; Sanskrit) is a Buddhist term that has been translated as "sense base", "sense-media" or "sense sphere."



 In Buddhism, there are six internal sense bases (Pali: ajjhattikāni āyatanāni; also known as, "organs", "gates", "doors", "powers" or "roots") and six external sense bases (bāhirāni āyatanāni or "sense objects"; also known as vishaya or "domains").



Thus, there are six internal-external (organ-object) pairs of sense bases:

• eye and visible objects
  
• ear and sound
  
• nose and odor
  
• tongue and taste
  
• body and touch
  mind
• and mental objects
  
  

Buddhism and other Indian epistemologies identify six "senses" as opposed to the Western identification of five. In Buddhism, "mind" denotes an internal sense organ which interacts with sense objects that include sense impressions, feelings, perceptions and volition.

Relationship to eternalism and annihilationism

While the concept of a soul (jiva) is distinct from the concept of a self (atta, ātman), certain doctrines concerning the soul are seen to contradict the notion of anatta. Eternalism, or the idea that there is a soul distinct from the body, implies the existence of an eternal self, which the Buddha rejected. Annihilationism, or the idea that the soul and the body are the same, implies the existence of a temporary self that is later destroyed upon death, which the Buddha also rejected.





Anatta and moral responsibility



While the Buddha attacked the assumptions of existence of an eternal Self, he would refer to the existence of a conventional self-subject to conditional phenomena and responsible, in the causal-moral sense, for karma. Peter Harvey writes that according to the suttas,

It can thus be said that, while an empirical self exists - or rather consists of a changing flow of mental and physical states which neither unchangingly exists nor does not exist - no metaphysical Self can be apprehended.

There are many statements in the suttas to the effect that a person acts, and then reaps the consequences. These statements are made to rebut the various theories circulating among philosophers of the Buddha's time that denied the efficacy of moral action, attributing all change to fate; these were forms of determinism. The Buddha's statements are not metaphysical in nature, and do not imply an unchanging subject of experience. Instead, continuity is maintained not by positing an extraempirical entity such as a Self, but by a theory of causality.



The Buddha criticized two main theories of moral responsibility; the doctrine that posited an unchanging Self as a subject, which came to be known as "atthikavāda", and the doctrine that did not do so, and instead denied moral responsibility, which came to be known as "natthikavāda". He rejected them both on empirical grounds. The following interaction of the Buddha pertains to the latter theory: The Buddha was silent to the questions of the paribbajako (wandering ascetic) Vacchagotta of “Is there a self?” or “Is there not a self?” [SN.5:44,10]. When Ananda later asked about his silence, the Buddha said that to affirm or deny the existence of an eternal self would have sided with sectarian theories and have disturbed Vacchagotta even more. The early Suttas see even Annihilationism, which the Buddha equated with denial of a Self, as tied up with belief in a Self. It is seen as arising due to conceiving a Self in some sort of relationship to the personality-factors. It is thus rooted in the 'I am' attitude; even the attitude 'I do not exist' arises from a preoccupation with 'I'. The Buddha appealed to experience in his refutation of natthikavāda, saying: "To one who sees, with proper understanding, the arising of the things in the world, the belief in nonexistence would not occur."



The Buddha was also careful not to allow an atthikavādin interpretation of his doctrine of causality. In response to the question from a man named Acela Kassapa as to whether or not suffering is self-caused, the Buddha gave a negative reply; "A person acts and the same person experiences [the result] — this, Kassapa, which you emphatically call 'suffering self-wrought', amounts to the eternalist theory." In responding in this way, the Buddha indicated the connection between the problem of personal identity and moral responsibility.



This process-view of a person does not see personality as a chaotic flux, but as a law-governed moving pattern which only changes insofar as supporting conditions change. In spite of the changes taking place in a person, some character-patterns are repeated, even over many lives, before they are worn out or replaced by others in accordance with the law of dependent origination. The complex of conditions arises out of an interaction of those processes internal to a person's own stream of psychological processes, that is, past or present karma, with those from the external world. Some of the external conditions will in turn be influenced or generated by internal processes. Thus the person-process both changes and is changed by its environment.



The principles of causality are key to the Buddha's teachings; they provide a vital perspective on his doctrine as a whole and show how to see it integrated positively in the causal relationships of the mental-physical factors of the experience of life. Causal relationships were detailed in the Buddha’s analysis of dependent origination and idappaccayata (lit. “This is founded on that”).